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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
“Corporate giving in South Africa has gradually shifted from being a 
philanthropic voluntary activity that responded in an ad hoc way to welfare 
needs, to becoming a more professional, performance-driven pursuit, 
focused on achieving developmental impact.”1     
 
Corporate social responsibility refers to the “value system which a company 
adopts in order to be responsible to broader society.”2 In South Africa, 
corporate social responsibility is shaped by the following frameworks: 
 indirectly it is shaped by the 2001 Millennium Development Goals, a 
framework of eight goals adopted by member countries of the United 
Nations to be achieved by 2015. The goals are to eradicate extreme 
poverty and hunger, achieve universal primary education, promote 
gender equality and empower women, reduce child mortality, improve 
maternal health, combat HIV/ Aids, malaria and other diseases, ensure 
environmental stability and develop a global partnership for 
development;3 and 
 it is directly shaped by the 2003 Broad-based Black Economic 
Empowerment Act4 and the documents derived therefrom and based 
thereon. 
 
The purpose of this paper is to focus on a particular aspect of corporate 
social responsibility in South Africa, namely, that of the broad-based black 
economic empowerment‟s corporate socio-economic development 
contributions and to determine whether the contributions by businesses to 
corporate socio-economic development are deductible in terms of section 11, 
                                                 
1 Trialogue The CSI Handbook 9ed (2006) 6. 
2 Trialogue The CSI Handbook 8ed (2005) 6. 
3 Samuel Njenga and Arnold Smit Leading the way through CSI (2007) 2. 
4 Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act, 53 of 2003, hereinafter referred to as 
the “B-BBEE Act”. 
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read with section 23(g), of the Income Tax Act.5 In reaching a conclusion in 
respect of this issue, due consideration will be given to the case law relating 
to the interpretation of the requirements of section 11, read with section 23(g) 
of the Income Tax Act, with specific emphasis on the Supreme Court of 
Appeal decision in the case of Warner Lamberts SA (Pty) Ltd v 
Commissioner, SARS,6 which case considered the deductibility of corporate 
social responsibility expenditure. 
  
In order to qualify as a tax deductible expense in terms of the Income Tax 
Act, an expense must be actually incurred, it must be incurred in the 
production of income, it must not be of a capital nature and it must be derived 
from a trade carried on by a taxpayer.  
 
Prior to considering the tax deductibility of the broad-based black economic 
development‟s corporate socio-economic development contributions, it is 
necessary to develop an understanding of the framework within which these 
contributions are made and the nature and purpose of the said contributions.  
 
2. BROAD-BASED BLACK ECONOMIC EMPOWERMENT  
 
Black economic empowerment7 can be defined as “an integrated and 
coherent socio-economic process ... which aims to redress past imbalances 
by transferring and conferring ownership, management and control of South 
Africa's financial and economic resources to the majority of its citizens and 
ensure broader participation of Black people in the economy in order to 
achieve sustainable development and prosperity.”8 
                                                 
5 58 of 1962, hereinafter referred to as the “Income Tax Act”. 
6  2003 (5) SA 344 (SCA). 
7 Hereinafter referred to as “BEE”. 
8 Black Economic Empowerment Commission „Presentation Prepared for the Portfolio 
Committee on Trade and Industry” (2000). Available at 
www.pmg.za/docs/2000/appendices/000913BEE.htm [Accessed 9 February 2010].   
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The South African government initially adopted a narrow based approach to 
BEE in that the focus was exclusively on transformation within the spheres of 
ownership and management. However, with the coming into effect of the B-
BBEE Act in 2003, the approach has evolved into one which focuses on 
transformation and empowerment at all levels of society.9 
 
Section 1 of the B-BBEE Act defines broad-based black economic 
empowerment as follows: 
“the economic empowerment of all black people10 including women, 
workers, youth, people with disabilities and people living in rural areas 
through diverse but integrated socio-economic strategies that include, 
but are not limited to -  
a)  increasing the number of black people that manage, own and 
control enterprises and productive assets; 
b) facilitating ownership and management of enterprises and 
productive assets by communities, workers, cooperatives and 
other collective enterprises; 
c)  human resource and skills development; 
d)  achieving equitable representation in all occupational categories 
and levels of the workforce; 
e)  preferential procurement; and 
f)  investment in enterprises that are owned or managed by black 
people.”11  
 
                                                 
9 Vuyo Jack with Kyle Harris Broad-Based BEE – The Complete Guide 1ed (2007) 22. 
10 Section 1 of the B-BBEE Act, defines “black people” as a generic term which means 
Africans, Coloureds and Indians. References hereinafter to “black people” shall be 
deemed to refer to the aforesaid definition of the term.  
11 B-BBEE Act, s1. 
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The B-BBEE Act is a concise document which makes provision for the 
Minister of Trade and Industry to issue explanatory codes of good practice on 
BEE, which codes are intended to set out the detailed matters giving effect to 
the objectives of the B-BBEE Act,12 and also makes provision for the Minister 
of Trade and Industry to promote and publish in the Government Gazette 
transformation charters, which charters are intended to advance the 
objectives of the B-BBEE Act in respect of a particular sector of the 
economy.13   
 
In terms of section 10 of the B-BBEE Act, the codes of good practice are 
binding on organs of state and public entities in determining and developing 
criteria for the issuing of licences, concessions and other authorisations in 
terms of any law, the implementation of a preferential procurement policy, the 
sale of state-owned enterprises and the entering into partnerships with the 
private sector.14 As section 10 of the B-BBEE Act makes no reference to the 
applicability of the codes of good practice on persons and entities within the 
private sector, it could be assumed that the B-BBEE Act does not apply to the 
private sector. However, based on the fact that many businesses within the 
private sector require statutory licences, concessions and other 
authorisations in terms of law or could intend doing business with an organ of 
state or public entity, it is the business needs of such entities which will 
compel them to comply with the B-BBEE Act and the codes of good practice.    
 
The Codes of Good Practice15, promulgated in February 2007, gives entities 
guidance on the implementation of BEE by inter alia addressing the following 
matters: 
 the introduction of a generic scorecard which sets out the different 
elements of a business which will be measured in determining the BEE 
                                                 
12 B-BBEE Act, s9. 
13 B-BBEE Act, s12. 
14 B-BBEE Act, s10. 
15 The Codes of Good Practice issued under section 9 of the Broad-Based Black Economic 
Empowerment Act, 53 of 2003, GNR 112 GG 29617 of 9 February 2007, hereinafter 
referred to as the “Codes of Good Practice”.   
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status of the business and the weighting attached to the different 
elements; 
 the categorisation of BEE entities depending on their turnover and 
applying different formulae in respect of the measurement of the BEE 
status of the different categories of BEE entities; and  
 guidelines for the development and gazetting of transformation charters 
and sector codes.        
 
The elements of the generic scorecard as set out in the Codes of Good 
Practice are as follows: 
 ownership, which measures the effective ownership of enterprises by 
black people, is allocated a maximum weighting of 20 out of 100 points 
on the scorecard; 
 management control, which measures the effective control of 
enterprises by black people, is allocated a maximum weighting of 10 out 
of 100 points on the scorecard;  
 employment equity, which measures initiatives intended to achieve 
employment equity in the workplace under the B-BBEE Act and the 
Employment Equity Act, 55 of 1998, is allocated a maximum weighting 
of 15 out of 100 points on the scorecard; 
 skills development, which measures the extent to which employers 
carry out initiatives designed to develop the competencies of black 
employees, is allocated a maximum weighting of 15 out of 100 points 
on the scorecard;   
 preferential procurement, which measures the extent to which 
enterprises buy goods and services from suppliers with strong BEE 
procurement recognition levels, is allocated a maximum weighting of 20 
out of 100 points on the scorecard; 
 enterprise development, which measures the extent to which 
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enterprises carry out initiatives intended to assist and accelerate the 
development and sustainability of other enterprises, is allocated a 
maximum weighting of 15 out of 100 point on the scorecard; and 
 socio-economic development initiatives, which measures the extent to 
which enterprises carry out initiatives that contribute towards socio-
economic development or sector specific initiatives that promote access 
to the economy for black people, is allocated a maximum weighting of 5 
out of 100 point on the scorecard.16  
 
The generic scorecard is applicable to business entities which have an 
annual turnover exceeding R35 million. In respect of entities which do not 
satisfy this requirement, the Codes of Good Practice identify three other 
business categories, namely: 
 exempted micro-enterprises, which have an annual turnover of less 
than R5 million, are automatically accorded a BEE status which is 
equivalent to having scored between 65 and 75 points on the generic 
scorecard; 
 qualifying small enterprises, which have an annual turnover of between 
R5 million and R35 million, can elect to be assessed on any four of the 
seven elements of the generic scorecard and the said four elements are 
each allocated a weighting of 25 out of 100 points; and 
 start-up enterprises, which qualify as such in the first year following their 
formation or incorporation, are treated as exempted micro-enterprises.17 
 
The B-BBEE Act and the Codes of Good Practice give recognition to two 
other documents which regulate the implementation of BEE, namely, 
transformation charters and sector codes. A transformation charter, as 
referred to in section 12 of the B-BBEE Act, is “evidence of the commitment 
by all stakeholders to promote BEE in the applicable sector and is not binding 
                                                 
16 Codes of Good Practice, Code 000, Statement 000. 
17  Codes of Good Practice, Code 000, Statement 000.  
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upon organs of state or public entities”.18 Notwithstanding the existence of a 
transformation charter applicable to a particular sector of the economy, the 
said sector remains subject to the Codes of Good Practice.19 A sector code 
which is applicable to a particular sector of the economy, on the other hand, 
is promulgated under section 9 of the B-BBEE Act and as such enjoys equal 
status with that of the Codes of Good Practice and any other code 
promulgated in terms of section 9 of the B-BBEE Act. It should however be 
noted that if there is any uncertainty in the interpretation of a sector code, the 
Codes of Good Practice will prevail.20   
 
After the coming into force of the B-BBEE Act but prior to the promulgation of 
the Codes of Good Practice and in an effort to avoid government intervention 
in the regulation of BEE, a number of sectors of the economy began 
processes to formulate charters for their respective sectors. Four such sector 
charters had been finalised and forty others had been in the process of being 
finalised at the time the draft Codes of Good Practice were published.21 Of 
these sector charters, two sectors of the economy went a step further and 
adopted their sector charters into the legislation which applied to the said 
sectors, namely, the Mining Charter and Scorecard of the mining sector is 
contained in the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act22 and 
the Petroleum and Liquid Fuels Charter of the petroleum and liquid fuels 
sector is contained in the Petroleum Products Amendment Act.23 A unique 
approach developed within the mining sector to drive BEE is that the MPRD 
Act authorises the Department of Minerals and Energy to base the granting 
of mining rights and licenses upon the BEE compliance of a particular 
applicant. 
 
To date, the following sector codes have been promulgated and 
transformation charters have been gazetted, namely: 
                                                 
18 Codes of Good Practice, Code 000, Statement 010, para 7. 
19 Codes of Good Practice, Code 000, Statement 010, para 7. 
20 Codes of Good Practice, Code 000, Statement 010, para 7. 
21 Trialogue (note 1) at 14. 
22  28 of 2002, hereinafter referred to as the “MPRD Act”.  
23  58 of 2003, hereinafter referred to as the “PPA Act”. 
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 the Integrated Transport Sector Codes;24 
 the Forestry Sector Code;25 
 the Construction Sector Code;26 
 the Tourism Sector Code;27 
 the Property Sector Charter;28 
 the Financial Sector Charter;29 
 the Agri-BEE Charter;30 and 
 the Marketing, Advertising and Communication Sector Charter.31 
 
3. CORPORATE SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
 
As previously stated, one of the elements of the generic scorecard as set out 
in the Codes of Good Practice is that of socio-economic development, which 
is allocated a weighting of 5 out of 100 points on the generic scorecard. The 
                                                 
24  Integrated Transport Sector Codes, issued under section 9(1) of the Broad-Based Black 
Economic Empowerment Act, 53 of 2003, GNR 1162 GG 32511 of 21 August 2009, 
hereinafter referred to as the “Integrated Transport Sector Codes”.   
25  Forestry Sector Code, issued under section 9(1) of the Broad-Based Black Economic 
Empowerment Act, 53 of 2003, GNR 873 GG 32320 of 12 June 2009, hereinafter referred 
to as the “Forestry Sector Code”.   
26  Construction Sector Code, issued under section 9(1) of the Broad-Based Black Economic 
Empowerment Act, 53 of 2003, GNR 873 GG 32320 of 12 June 2009, hereinafter referred 
to as the “Construction Sector Code”. 
27  Tourism Sector Code, issued under section 9(1) of the Broad-Based Black Economic 
Empowerment Act, 53 of 2003, GNR 862 GG 32305 of 5 June 2009, hereinafter referred 
to as the “Tourism Sector Code”. 
28  Property Sector Charter, issued under section 12 of the Broad-Based Black Economic 
Empowerment Act, 53 of 2003, GNR 1248 GG 30333 of 5 October 2007, hereinafter 
referred to as the “Property Sector Charter”. 
29  Financial Sector Charter, issued under section 12 of the Broad-Based Black Economic 
Empowerment Act, 53 of 2003, GNR 110 GG 29610 of 9 February 2007, hereinafter 
referred to as the “Financial Sector Charter”. 
30  Agri-BEE Sector Charter, issued under section 12 of the Broad-Based Black Economic 
Empowerment Act, 53 of 2003, GNR 314 GG 30886 of 20 March 2008, hereinafter 
referred to as the “Agri-BEE Sector Charter”. 
31  Marketing, Advertising and Communication Sector Charter, issued under section 12 of the 
Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act, 53 of 2003, GNR 924 GG 31371 of 26 
August 2008, hereinafter referred to as the “Marketing, Advertising and Communication 
Sector Charter”. 
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measurement of the socio-economic development element of the generic 
scorecard is based on net profit after tax and is calculated as 1% of the 
annual average net profit after tax of an entity. 
 
The existing sector codes and transformation charters include the concept of 
“socio-economic development” in the following forms: 
 the Integrated Transport Sector Codes consist of eight separate sub-
sector codes, all of which duplicate the element of socio-economic 
development contributions and the measurement thereof from the 
generic scorecard but, in addition thereto, seven of these sub-sector 
codes state that contributions to certain projects will be enhanced by a 
factor of 1.25. The result of such enhancements is that there is further 
incentive for entities within this sector to contribute towards poverty 
alleviation, HIV/ AIDS, education, community development, the 
provision of housing, industry awareness and rural development 
structures;32 
 the Forestry Sector Code duplicates the element of socio-economic 
development contributions and the measurement thereof from the 
generic scorecard. The Code also makes provision for bonus points so 
that an enterprise can obtain a maximum of an additional three points 
for 0.75% of net profit after tax spent on sector specific initiatives on 
socio-economic development;33 
 the Construction Sector Code utilises the term “corporate social 
investments”, which it defines as projects “aimed primarily at black 
groups, communities and individuals that contribute towards 
transformation and have a strong developmental approach”. The Code 
commits members of the particular sector to utilise the resources at 
                                                 
32  Integrated Transport Sector Codes (note 24) at paras 3-4 of the Bus Commuter and 
Coach Services Sub-Sector Code, paras 6-7 of the Taxi Industry Sub-Sector Code, para 
3 of the Road Freight Sub-Sector Code, para 3of the Public Transport Sub-Sector Code, 
para 3 of the Maritime transport and Services Industry Sub-Sector Code, para 3 of the 
Forwarding and Clearing Sub-Sector Code, para 3 of the Rail Sub-Sector Code and para 
3 of the Domestic Aviation Sub-Sector Code. 
33  Forestry Sector Code (note 25) at paras 14-15. 
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their disposal to initiate and contribute to corporate social investment 
projects and registered development oriented non-profit organisations 
that primarily benefit black people and that promote development in 
under resourced areas. The Code allocates a weighting of 5 out of 100 
points to corporate social investment and states that each enterprise will 
achieve a target of 0.25% of the annual payroll of the enterprise on 
corporate social investment by 2013;34 
 the Tourism Sector Code utilises the term “socio-economic development 
and industry specific” to describe this category of the scorecard and 
allocates a weighting of 25 out of 175 points to this category. Included 
within this category are approved socio-economic development 
contributions (measured as 1% of net profit after tax) and the 
recruitment of black new recruits with no prior work experience 
(measured as 10% of  total number of new recruits);35   
 the Property Sector Charter utilises the term “corporate social 
investments”, which it defines as projects “aimed primarily at black 
groups, communities and individuals that contribute towards 
transformation”. The Charter allocates a weighting of 2 out of 100 points 
to corporate social investment which is measured as 1% of the net profit 
after tax. This Charter also recognises a further element of investment 
and property development in under-resourced areas and allocates a 
weighting of 8 out of 100 points to this element which is measured as 
10% of total annual investments;36 
 the Financial Sector Charter utilises the term “corporate social 
investments”, which it defines as projects “aimed primarily at black 
groups, communities and individuals that contribute towards 
transformation and have a strong developmental approach”. The 
Charter allocates a weighting of 3 out of 100 points to corporate social 
investment and states that each financial institution to which the Charter 
applies will achieve a target of 0.5% of the post tax operating profits of 
                                                 
34  Construction Sector Code (note 26) at paras 5, 7 and 8. 
35  Tourism Sector Code (note 27) at para 8. 
36  Property Sector Charter (note 28) at paras 11, 12, 18 and 19.  
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the institution on corporate social investment by 2014;37 
 the Agri-BEE Charter utilises the term “rural development, poverty 
alleviation and corporate social investment” to describe this category of 
the scorecard and allocates a weighting of 10 out of 100 points to this 
category. The Charter measures this as 1.5% net profit after tax spent 
on corporate social investment contributions and/ or 10% of land made 
available to farm workers. The Charter also makes provision for an 
additional 1 bonus point for corporate social investment contributions 
benefiting black people in rural communities or geographic areas 
identified in the government's integrated sustainable development 
programme and urban renewal programme;38 and  
 the Marketing, Advertising and Communication Sector Charter 
duplicates the element of socio-economic development contributions 
and the measurement thereof from the generic scorecard but adds that 
the measurement of 1% of net profit after tax is to be increased to 5% of 
net profit after tax by the year 2014.39 
 
As aforesaid, the Mining Sector Charter is contained in the MPRD Act. 
Section 100 of the MPRD Act refers to the development of a broad-based 
socio-economic empowerment charter to address the objects of the MPRD 
Act, including the promotion of employment and the advancement of the 
social and economic welfare of all South Africans and contributions towards 
the socio-economic development of areas in which holders of mining and 
production rights operate. The MPRD Act enforces the Mining Charter as 
follows – a determining factor in the granting of a mining right is compliance 
with the objects of the Mining Charter,40 the holder of a mining right/ permit 
holder and a production right must submit annual reports to the Director-
General of the Department of Minerals and Energy on the extent of the 
entity's compliance with the Mining Charter and the said annual reports will 
also be considered in the renewal application of any right in terms of the 
                                                 
37  Financial Sector Charter (note 29) at para 13.   
38  Agri-BEE Charter (note 30) at para 5. 
39  Marketing, Advertising and Communication Sector Charter (note 31) at para 7. 
40  MPRD Act, s 23(1)(h). 
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MPRD Act.41 The Mining Charter refers to integrated socio-economic 
development for host communities, major labour sending areas and areas 
that due to the unintended consequences of mining have become ghost 
towns and states that the mining sector undertakes to formulate integrated 
development plans for these areas and communities.42     
 
The Petroleum and Liquid Fuels Charter, as contained in the PPA Act, states 
that in considering licence applications in terms of the said Act, effect must 
be given to the Petroleum and Liquid Fuels Charter and proof of 
implementation thereof. It should be noted that the Petroleum and Liquid 
Fuels Charter makes no provision for corporate socio-economic development 
in any manner or form, other than indirectly by means of capacity building, 
procurement, employment equity and financing of historically disadvantaged 
companies. Despite this exclusion within the Petroleum and Liquid Fuels 
Charter, it could be argued that because the B-BBEE Act requires all sector 
codes and charters to be in line with the B-BBEE Act and to be approved by 
the Minister of Trade and Industry, the petroleum and liquid fuels sector may 
be obliged to comply with the Codes of Good Practice or amend their own 
charter to bring it in line with the Codes of Good Practice.    
 
The Codes of Good Practice include the following concepts in its formulation 
of the term “socio-economic development”: 
 monetary or non-monetary contributions carried out for the benefit of 
any projects approved for this purpose by any organ of state or sectors, 
including without limitation, projects focusing on environmental 
conservation, awareness, education and waste management, and 
projects targeting infrastructural development, enterprise creation or 
reconstruction in underdeveloped areas, rural communities or 
geographic areas identified in the government's integrated sustainable 
                                                 
41  MPRD Act, s 25(2)(h) and s 28(2). 
42  Broad-Based Socio-Economic Empowerment Charter for the South African Mining 
Industry, paras 2 and 4. Available at http://www.dme.gov.za/minerals/mining_charter.stm 
[Accessed 9 February 2010].  
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rural development or urban renewal programmes;43 and  
 programmes in the form of development programmes for women, youth, 
people with disabilities and people living in rural areas, support of 
healthcare and HIV/ AIDS programmes, support for education 
programmes, resources and materials at primary, secondary and 
tertiary school level, as well as bursaries and scholarships, and 
community training, skills development for unemployed people and 
adult basic education and training or support of arts, culture or sporting 
development programmes.44    
 
“Corporate social investment”, the term used in certain of the sector codes 
and transformation charters instead of the term “socio-economic 
development” has been defined as “the way in which companies care for the 
well-being of the social and ecological environment of the communities in 
which they operate. To this end they invest, in a variety of ways, in the 
advancement of certain socially and/ or environmentally defined needs, 
projects or causes extraneous to their regular business activities.”45    
 
In the context of BEE and for purposes of this paper, the term “corporate 
socio-economic development” shall be used to refer to the terms “corporate 
social investment” and “socio-economic development”. 
  
4. DEDUCTABILITY IN TERMS OF THE INCOME TAX ACT 
 
4.1  General deduction formula 
 
                                                 
43 Codes of Good Practice, sch 1, part 2, definition of “approved socio-economic 
development contributions”. 
44 Codes of Good Practice, sch 1, part 2, definition of “socio-economic development 
programmes”. 
45 Njenga and Smit (note 3) at 4. 
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In terms of section 11(a) of the Income Tax Act, a taxpayer carrying on any 
trade is allowed to deduct certain expenses from its income provided that the 
following requirements are satisfied, namely: 
 the expense was actually incurred; 
 in the production of income; and  
 the expense is not of a capital nature.46 
   
Section 23(g) of the Income Tax contains a proviso to section 11 in that it 
states that an expense will not be deductible from income derived from trade 
to the extent that the amount sought to be deducted was not expended for 
the purposes of trade.47   
 
Section 11, read with section 23(g), of the Income Tax Act is considered to be 
the general deduction formula and all the different components of the general 
deduction formula have to be satisfied in order for an expense to be 
deductible for tax purposes.48 Based on the aforegoing, it is necessary to 
understand the components of the general deduction formula prior to 
considering the applicability of the general deduction formula to the broad-
based black economic empowerment‟s corporate socio-economic 
development contributions. 
 
4.1.1  Expense actually incurred  
 
Although section 11(a) of the Income Tax Act applies to expenses and losses, 
this paper will be limited to the consideration of section 11(a) of the Income 
Tax Act as it relates to expenses. Expenditure “is not restricted to an outlay of 
                                                 
46 Income Tax Act, s 11(a). 
47 Income Tax Act, s 23(g). 
48 Huxham and Haupt Notes on South African Income Tax 28ed (2009) 87 and 91. 
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cash but includes outlays of amounts in a form other than cash.”49 However, 
when the expense is in a form other than cash, one will need to determine 
the cost to the taxpayer in quantifying the expense for tax purposes.50 
 
In the case of Port Elizabeth Electric Tramway Co Ltd v CIR51 the taxpayer 
attempted to deduct from its gross income the damages paid by it as a result 
of the death of a driver employed by the taxpayer. In his judgment, Waterman 
AJP held that the term “actually incurred” does not require that the expense 
must be necessary and the authorities can therefore not penalise one 
taxpayer for conducting his business extravagantly while rewarding another 
taxpayer for conducting his business efficiently.52 Despite the aforegoing, the 
other components of the general deduction formula could be effective in 
determining that an expense is excessive and not in the production of income 
and for the purposes of trade.53  
 
In the PE Tramway case the court stated that “expenses „actually incurred‟ 
does not mean „actually paid‟”54 and one should consider whether the liability 
to pay the expense has been actually incurred rather than whether it has in 
fact been paid.55  
 
In Edgars Stores Ltd v CIR,56 the taxpayer attempted to deduct the rental paid 
in respect of the business premises leased by the taxpayer. In the dissenting 
judgment of Corbett JA, the law applicable to the term “actually incurred” was 
summarised and it was held that “only expenditure (otherwise qualifying for 
deduction) in respect of which the taxpayer has incurred an unconditional 
legal obligation during the year of assessment in question may be deducted 
                                                 
49 Madelaine Stiglingh et al Silke: South African Income Tax 2009 (2009) 95.  
50 David Meyerowitz Meyerowitz on Income Tax 2008-2009ed (2009) 11-13. 
51 (1936) CPD 241, 8 SATC 13, hereinafter referred to as the “PE Tramway case”. 
52 Ibid at page 244. 
53 Meyerowitz (note 50) at 11-41. 
54 PE Tramway case (note 51) at page 244. 
55 Ibid. See also Nationale Pers v Kommisaris van Binnelandse Inkomste (1986) 48 SATC  
55. 
56 1988 (3) SA 876 (A), hereinafter referred to as the “Edgars Stores case”. 
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in terms of s11(a) from income returned for that year. The obligation may be 
unconditional ab initio or, though initially conditional, may become 
unconditional by fulfilment of the condition during the year of assessment; in 
either case the relative expenditure is deductible in that year. But if the 
obligation is initially incurred as a conditional one during a particular year of 
assessment and the condition is fulfilled only in the following year of 
assessment, it is deductible only in the latter year of assessment (the other 
requirements of deductibility being satisfied).”57  
      
4.1.2  In the production of income 
 
Section 11(a) of the Income Tax Act refers to expenditure incurred in the 
production of income. As an expense is not in and of itself an act which can 
produce an income, one needs to give consideration to the action associated 
with the said expense in order to determine if this requirement is satisfied.58 
 
In the PE Tramways case, it was stated that “income is produced by the 
performance of a series of acts and attendant upon them are expenses. Such 
expenses are deductible expenses provided they are so closely linked to 
such acts as to be regarded as part of the cost of performing them.”59 
 
The test for determining whether an expense is incurred in the production of 
income, as enumerated by Waterman AJP in the PE Tramways case, is the 
leading test on this matter and this test has been approved by the Appellate 
Division on more than one occasion.60   
 
                                                 
57 Ibid at page 889. 
58 Huxham and Haupt (note 48) at 95. 
59 PE Tramway case (note 51) at page 245. 
60 Huxham and Haupt (note 48) at 95. See also CIR v Genn & Co (Pty) Ltd 1955 (3) SA 293 
(A); CIR v African Oxygen Ltd 1963 (1) SA 681 (A) and CIR v Allied Building Society 1963 
(4) SA 1 (A). 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
  
 
19 
  
In the PE Tramways case Waterman AJP stated that there are two questions 
which arise, namely: 
 was the act, to which the expenditure is attached, performed in the 
production of income? 
 how closely is the expenditure linked to the production of income?61    
 
In respect of the first question, Waterman AJP  held that “provided the act is 
bona fide done for the purpose of carrying on the trade which earns the 
income the expenditure attendant on it is deductible”62 and in respect of the 
second question, Waterman AJP held that “all expenses attached to the 
performance of a business operation bona fide performed for the purpose of 
earning income are deductible whether such expenses are necessary for its 
performance or attached to it by chance or are bona fide incurred for the 
more efficient performance of such operation provided they are so closely 
connected with it that they may be regarded as part of the cost of performing 
it.”63  
 
In Joffe and Co (Pty) Ltd v CIR,64 the taxpayer, an engineering company, was 
held liable in a claim of negligence and attempted to deduct the damages 
paid from its income. The court used the term “necessary concomitant” in 
describing the relationship of the expenditure to the income earning 
operations of the taxpayer65 and on application of this test to the facts, the 
court found that the damages paid were not deductible.  
 
In Sub-Nigel Ltd v CIR,66 the taxpayer, a mining company, attempted to 
deduct premiums paid on loss of profits insurance policies. It was argued by 
                                                 
61 PE Tramway case (note 51) at page 245. 
62 Ibid. 
63 Ibid at page 246. 
64  1946 AD 157, hereinafter referred to as the “Joffe case”. 
65 Ibid at page 163. 
66  1948 (4) SA 580 (A), hereinafter referred to as the “Sub-Nigel case”. 
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the Commissioner that the expense of paying the premiums did not produce 
an income and the expense was therefore not incurred in the production of 
income and as a result not deductible. The court held that the question is not 
whether a particular expense produced a particular income but rather 
whether the expense was incurred for the purpose of producing an income.67 
Based on the reasoning in this judgment, this requirement of the general 
deduction formula is not merely a factual test and one should consider the 
intention of the expense and whether the expense was incurred for the 
purpose of producing an income.  
 
In the case of CIR v Nemojim (Pty) Ltd68 Corbett JA found that the expenses 
sought to be deducted had a dual purpose and he distinguished between 
expenses which were deductible and those which were not deductible in 
terms of the general deduction formula. Based on this reasoning, Corbett JA 
applied a formula to apportion the expenses and as a result allowed certain 
of the expenses to be deducted. This case is the authority for applying the 
principle of apportionment to the deduction of expenses under the general 
deduction formula. 
  
4.1.3  Not of a capital nature 
 
The number of court cases which have dealt with the distinction between 
capital and revenue gives credence to the fact that the distinction is not an 
easy one to make and as a result one will need to consider the facts of each 
individual case in order to determine whether the expense is of a capital 
nature or a revenue nature. 
 
In the case of CIR v George Forest Timber Co Ltd,69 the taxpayer, a timber 
                                                 
67  Ibid at page 394. 
68  1983 (4) SA 935 (A). 
69  1924 AD 516. 
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merchant, sought to deduct the purchase price of the land on which the trees 
grew when it sold timber. The court considered whether the expense was of a 
capital or a revenue nature and Innes CJ held that “[t]here is a great 
difference between money spent in creating or acquiring a source of profit, 
and money spent in working it. The one is capital expenditure and the other 
is not ...”70       
 
In SIR v Cadac Engineering Works (Pty) Ltd,71 the taxpayer, a company with 
a registered licensed design, brought a court application against a third party 
which was selling a design similar to that of the taxpayer. The taxpayer 
attempted to deduct the costs of this court application as an expense in terms 
of the general deduction formula. The court held that there was an insufficient 
link between the expenditure and the income-earning structure of the 
taxpayer and the expense was therefore not deductible. In his judgment, 
Ogilvie Thompson JA stated that “the mere circumstance that a payment has 
neither created a new asset nor made any addition to any existing asset is 
not necessarily conclusive in favour of such payment being a revenue 
expense.”72      
 
In the English case of British Insulated and Helsby Cables Ltd v Atherton,73 
the court enquired whether the expense was incurred with a view to creating 
an enduring benefit and if an enduring benefit was created, it would be 
indicative of the capital nature of the expense. The court in the case of CIR v 
African Oxygen Ltd74 adopted this test into South African law. 
 
The main test developed by our courts in determining whether an expense is 
of a capital nature or a revenue nature was formulated in the case of New 
                                                 
70 Ibid at page 526. 
71  1965 (2) SA 511 (A). 
72  Ibid at page 522-523. 
73  1926 AC 205. 
74  1976 (4) SA 522 (A). 
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State Areas Ltd v CIR.75 The taxpayer in this case was a mining company 
which sought to deduct the cost of constructing sewers. In his judgment 
Waterman CJ held that there was a distinction between floating capital and 
fixed capital. The court stated that the question is whether the “expenditure ... 
should properly be regarded as part of the cost of performing the income 
earning operations or as part of the cost of establishing or improving or 
adding to the income-earning plant or machinery.”76 Waterman CJ continued 
to state that the “true nature of each transaction must be inquired into in 
order to determine whether the expenditure attached to it is capital or 
revenue expenditure. Its true nature is a matter of fact and the purpose of the 
expenditure is an important factor.”77 
In the case of Rand Mines (Mining and Services) Ltd v CIR,78 the taxpayer 
was a company which was part of a larger group of companies and provided 
management services to the group. The group of companies acquired a new 
mining company and required the taxpayer to pay millions of rands in order to 
acquire the management contract with this new mining company. The 
taxpayer in this case sought to deduct this expenditure under the general 
deduction formula. The court considered a number of factors which indicated 
that the expenditure in issue was of a capital nature and therefore not 
deductible, including the following: 
 the management contracts themselves were not the stock-in-trade of 
the taxpayer‟s and it was the managements services provided by the 
taxpayer which were its stock-in-trade;79 
 the acquisition of the management contracts were part of the income 
earning structure of the taxpayer as without the contracts, the taxpayer 
would not have the opportunity to generate an income;80 and 
 on a balance of the facts, the expenditure in issue was more closely 
related to the cost of adding to or enhancing the income earning 
structure of the taxpayer‟s business than to the cost of performing its 
                                                 
75  1946 AD 610, hereinafter referred to as the “New State Areas case”. 
76  Ibid at page 620-621.  
77  Ibid at page 627. 
78  1997 (1) SA 427 (A), hereinafter referred to as the “Rand Mines case”. 
79  Ibid at page 434. 
80  Ibid at page 435. 
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income earning operations.81  
 
It is true that there is no halfway house between capital and revenue and that 
if an expense is not of a capital nature then it must be of a revenue nature.82 
However, in the case of SIR v Guardian Assurance Holdings (SA) Ltd,83 the 
court apportioned an expense into a capital and revenue component. Muller 
JA held that “in the case where expenditure is laid out partly for income 
purposes and partly for capital purposes, but still exclusively for the purposes 
of trade, an apportionment should be permitted so as to allow a deduction in 
respect of that part of the expenditure apportioned to income.”84    
 
In the recent case of BP Southern Africa (Pty) Ltd v Commissioner, SARS,85 
the taxpayer sought to deduct the royalties paid by it to BP worldwide for the 
use of the trademarks, etc relating to the BP brand. The court had to decide 
whether the expenditure sought to be deducted was of a capital or a revenue 
nature and in reaching its decision the court considered previous case law on 
this issue and found that the expenditure was of a revenue nature. In his 
judgment, Poonan JA stated that “[t]he anticipated and actual recurrent 
nature of the disputed payments is a strong indicator that they related to 
revenue rather than capital. The recurrent cost of procuring the use of 
something which belongs to another is usually recognised as being of a 
revenue nature.”86      
 
4.1.4  Trade requirement 
 
“Trade” is defined in section 1 of the Income Tax Act as “every profession, 
trade, business, employment, calling, occupation or venture, including the 
                                                 
81  Ibid at page 436. 
82 Huxham and Haupt (note 48) at 98. 
83  1976 (4) SA 522 (A), hereinafter referred to as the “Guardian Assurance case”. 
84  Ibid at page 534. 
85  69 SATC 79, hereinafter referred to as the “BP case”. 
86  Ibid at para 14. 
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letting of any property and the use of or the grant of permission to use any 
patent or any design or any trade mark or any copyright, or any other 
property which is of a similar nature.”87 
 
Both section 11(a) and section 23(g) of the Income Tax Act refer to “trade” 
and it has been argued that as the trade requirements of section 23(g) are 
more onerous than that of section 11(a), “[a] taxpayer passing the test of s 
23(g) simultaneously passed the trade requirement embodied in s 11(a).”88   
 
In the preamble to section 11, reference is made to income derived from 
“carrying on any trade”89 and if one was to read section 11(a) together with 
the preamble to section 11, it could be interpreted to mean that the expenses 
sought to be deducted “must be incurred in the production of income derived 
from the carrying on of a trade.”90 
 
Section 23(g) of the Income Tax Act states that “[n]o deductions shall in any 
case be made in respect of … any moneys, claimed as a deduction from 
income derived from trade, to the extent to which such money were not laid 
out or expended for the purposes of trade.”91 It should be noted that section 
23(g) was amended in 1992 with the result that much of the case law relating 
to the interpretation of this section deal with the former section 23(g). Prior to 
its amendment, section 23(g) prohibited the deduction of expenses not 
“wholly or exclusively laid out or expended for the purposes of trade” and the 
effect of the amendment to section 23(g) is that apportionment between 
expenses incurred for a trade and non-trade purposes is allowed.92     
 
                                                 
87  Income Tax Act, s 1. 
88  Trevor Emslie et al Income Tax Cases and Materials 3ed (2001) 406. 
89  Income Tax Act, s 11. 
90  Emslie et al (note 88) at 406. 
91  Income Tax Act, s 23(g). 
92  Emslie et al (note 88) at 405. 
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In the case of De Beers Holdings (Pty) Ltd v CIR,93 Corbett JA held that “the 
absence of profit does not necessarily exclude a transaction from being part 
of the taxpayer‟s trade; and correspondingly moneys laid out in a non-
profitable transaction may nevertheless be wholly and exclusively expended 
for the purposes of trade within the terms of s 23(g). Such moneys may well 
be disbursed on the grounds of commercial expediency or in order indirectly 
to facilitate the carrying on of the taxpayer‟s trade.”94 The court in this case 
also compared the requirements of trade and production of income and held 
that an expense must satisfy both requirements in order to be deductible 
under the general deduction formula.95   
 
In CIR v Pick ‘n Pay Wholesalers (Pty) Ltd,96 the taxpayer sought to deduct 
an amount paid to a charity on the basis that the payment constituted an 
advertising expense. Nicholas AJA held that the taxpayer had a dual purpose 
in making the payments, namely, a philanthropic purpose and a business 
purpose.97 As this case was decided prior to the amendment of section 23(g), 
the fact that the expense was not incurred wholly and exclusively for the 
purpose of trade resulted in the expense not qualifying as a deductible 
expense.       
 
In his critique on the decision of Nicholas AJA in the Pick ‘n Pay case, Emslie 
considered the distinction between purpose and effect and stated that while 
the taxpayer in the Pick ‘n Pay case did “envisage a philanthropic effect, its 
purpose … was solely to enhance its business image.”98 Emslie went further 
to state that “one would expect that everything a public company does is for 
the purpose if its trade.”99  
 
                                                 
93  1986 (1) SA 8 (A), hereinafter referred to as the “De Beers case”. 
94  Ibid at page 36. 
95  Ibid at page 34. 
96  1987 (3) SA 453 (A) hereinafter referred to as the “Pick ‘n Pay case”.  
97  Ibid at page 471. 
98  TS Emslie „Is generosity a bar to tax deductibility‟ (1988) 105 South African Law Journal 
214 at 220. 
99  Ibid at 221. 
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It was the decision in Solaglass Finance Co (Pty) Ltd v CIR100 which lead the 
legislature to amend section 23(g) of the Income Tax Act. In this case the 
taxpayer was a subsidiary company within a group of companies which was 
set up with the object of loaning money to the other companies within the 
group. As it was a money-lender, the losses incurred by the taxpayer were of 
a revenue nature and therefore constituted deductible expenses. However, in 
his judgment, Botha JA considered the “nature of the activities carried on, the 
nature of the expenditure and the closeness (or remoteness) of the 
connection between the expenditure and the benefit derived therefrom by the 
group”101 and held that the taxpayer had a dual purpose in making loans, 
namely, to make a profit and to further the interests of the group of 
companies and due to the fact that this second purpose was not wholly and 
exclusively for the purposes of trade, the losses incurred by the taxpayer 
were not deductible.102         
 
In the case of ITC 1404,103 Friedman J considered the concept of profit as it 
relates to the trade requirement and held that “[w]here there is no reasonable 
prospect of the taxpayer making a profit, then, in the absence of any other 
factors, the Court may well be entitled to infer that the purpose of the 
expenditure was not trade … [b]ut what is clear is that the possibility or 
otherwise of earning a profit is simply a factor, perhaps the most important 
factor, and perhaps in the absence of anything else, a decisive factor, in 
considering whether or not, in particular, the requirement of s 23(g) has been 
met.”104     
 
4.2  Prohibited deductions 
 
Notwithstanding the general deduction formula, section 23 of the Income Tax 
                                                 
100  1991 (2) SA 257 (A). 
101  Ibid at page 284. 
102  Ibid at page 282. 
103  48 SATC 1, hereinafter referred to as “ITC 1404”. 
104  Ibid at page 3. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
  
 
27 
  
Act provides that the following expenses cannot be deducted from the gross 
income of a taxpayer, namely: 
 private, maintenance and domestic expenses; 
 recoverable expenses under a contract of insurance, guarantee, 
security or indemnity; 
 statutory interest, penalties and taxes; 
 provisions and reserves for future expenditure; 
 expenses incurred to produce exempt income; 
 notional expenditure; 
 the costs of scholarships or bursaries granted in lieu of a salary; 
 expenses incurred by labour brokers, personal service companies and 
personal service trusts; 
 restraints of trade payments, except those in accordance with section 
11(cA) of the Income Tax Act; 
 expenses relating to employment income, unless such expenses are 
specifically allowed in terms of the Income Tax Act; 
 assets acquired from government grants; and 
 unlawful activities, fines and penalties.105 
 
4.3  Special allowable deductions  
 
In addition to deductions allowed in terms of the general deduction formula, 
the Income Tax Act also specifies certain special deductions which would not 
ordinarily qualify for deduction in terms of the general deduction formula, 
namely: 
                                                 
105  Income Tax Act, s 23(a)-(o). 
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 annuities to former employees or partners and their dependants;106 
 bad debts;107 
 doubtful debts;108 
 donations to public benefit organizations and other qualifying 
beneficiaries;109 
 finance charges;110 
 pension, provident or benefit fund contributions by employers;111 
 future expenditure to be incurred in performance of obligations under 
contract from which taxpayer has derived an income;112 
 leave pay;113 
 legal costs;114 
 life insurance premiums;115 
 regional services councils and joint services board levies;116 
 repairs on property occupied for purposes of trade and from which 
income is derived;117 
 restraint of trade payments;118 
 learnership deductions;119 and 
 assessed losses.120 
                                                 
106  Income Tax Act, s 11(m). 
107  Income Tax Act, s 11(i). 
108  Income Tax Act, s 11(j). 
109  Income Tax Act, s 18A. 
110  Income Tax Act, s 11(bB). 
111  Income Tax Act, s 11(l). 
112  Income Tax Act, s 24C. 
113  Income Tax Act, s 23E. 
114  Income Tax Act, s 11(c). 
115  Income Tax Act, s 11(w). 
116  Income Tax Act, s 12(8). 
117  Income Tax Act, s 11(d). 
118  Income Tax Act, s 11(cA). 
119  Income Tax Act, s 12H. 
120  Income Tax Act, s 20. 
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4.4  Onus of proving deductibility 
 
In terms of section 82 of the Income Tax Act, the taxpayer claiming a 
deduction in terms of the Income Tax Act bears the burden of proving that he 
is entitled to such a deduction and consequently, it is the taxpayer who will 
have to prove that a particular expense complies with the requirements of the 
general deduction formula or any special deduction allowed in terms of the 
Income Tax Act.  
 
5. THE WARNER LAMBERT CASE 
 
The Warner Lambert case has particular relevance to the issue being 
considered in this paper as it dealt with the deductibility of corporate social 
responsibility expenditure.  
  
In the Warner Lambert case the taxpayer, a South African subsidiary 
company of an American parent company, was compelled to comply with 
certain obligations imposed on it by its parent company. In 1970, the taxpayer 
became a signatory to the Sullivan Code, which is a set of seven principles 
intended to govern American companies operating in South Africa. The 
principles included the “non-segregation of races in the workplace, equal and 
fair employment for all employees, equal pay, development of training 
programmes, increasing the number of disadvantaged persons in 
management and supervisory positions and improving the quality of 
employees‟ lives outside the work environment … [and] working to eliminate 
laws and customs that impede social, economic and political justice.121 
 
                                                 
121  Warner Lambert case (note 6) at para 4. 
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In 1986, the United States Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act compelled 
American parent companies to ensure that their South African subsidiary 
companies complied with the Act, failing which the American parent company 
would be liable to pay fines and the directors of the parent company could 
also face imprisonment.           
  
In the Warner Lambert case, the taxpayer argued that in order to comply with 
the Sullivan Code and the associated requirements of its parent company, it 
incurred certain expenses relating to social upliftment, including participation 
in national conventions, peace initiatives, information technology support, 
adopting schools and assisting start-up business operations.122 The taxpayer 
stated that compliance was necessary to the parent company so as to avoid 
political embarrassment and to protect its businesses in the United States 
with the result that if the taxpayer failed to comply with the Sullivan Code, the 
business of the taxpayer could be closed by the parent company or the 
parent company could sell the business of the taxpayer to a third party.123 The 
taxpayer proved that these concerns were valid as other American parent 
companies had taken such action against their South African subsidiaries for 
failure to comply with the Sullivan Code.   
 
In his assessment, the Commissioner disallowed the deduction of the 
Sullivan Code expenditure on the basis that the expenditure had not been 
incurred in the production of income.124  
 
On appeal by the taxpayer to the Special Income Tax Court under case 
number ITC 1717,125 Davis J held that the expenditure was incurred in the 
production of income. However, Davis J held further that because the 
expenditure was incurred to protect the income earning structure of the 
taxpayer, the expenditure was capital in nature and the deduction of the 
                                                 
122  Ibid at para 6. 
123  Ibid at para 5. 
124  Ibid at para 3. 
125  64 SATC 32. 
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expenditure could therefore not be allowed. 
 
On appeal by the taxpayer to the Supreme Court of Appeal, the 
Commissioner argued that there were three purposes to the expenditure 
which the taxpayer sought to deduct in the Warner Lambert case, namely: 
 to save the parent company of the taxpayer from embarrassment and 
sanctions; 
 altruism; and 
 to protect the income-earning structure of the taxpayer.126  
 
With regard to the first purpose identified by the Commissioner, Conradie JA 
stated that “[m]oney spent by a taxpayer in order to advance the interests of 
the group of companies to which it belongs is not regarded as expenditure in 
the production of income. The link between the expenditure and the 
production of income is too tenuous.”127 
 
With regard to the second purpose identified by the Commissioner, Conradie 
JA stated that “[m]oneys expended by a taxpayer from motives of pure 
liberality also fail to qualify as expenditure in the production of income.”128  
 
In considering the third purpose identified by the Commissioner, Conradie JA 
stated that “[i]t is quite easy to mistake the purpose of an act for its 
consequences”129 and even though the “consequences of an act often 
proclaim its purpose,”130 the court must look at the evidence and “[i]f there is 
credible evidence about a taxpayer‟s purpose it is not open to the Court to 
                                                 
126  Warner Lambert case (note 6) at para 10. 
127  Ibid at para 11. 
128  Ibid. 
129  Ibid at page 13. 
130  Ibid at para 14. 
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turn what is in reality a consequence into a purpose and ascribe that to the 
taxpayer.”131 
 
The court held that “[t]o qualify as moneys expended in the course of trade, 
an outlay does not itself have to produce a profit.”132 
    
Based on the aforegoing and the facts before the court, the court found that 
the “Sullivan Code expenses were bona fide incurred for the performance of 
the [taxpayer‟s] income producing operation and formed part of the cost of 
performing it. The social responsibility expenditure was therefore incurred for 
the purposes of trade and for no other.”133  
 
A factor which the court took into consideration in reaching its decision was 
the different treatment accorded to the different forms of Sullivan Code 
expenditure. In the Warner Lambert case it was only the social responsibility 
expenditure which was a problem as the other expenditure relating to the 
Sullivan Code satisfied the requirements of the general deduction formula 
and was therefore deductible. In this regard, the court held that if the purpose 
of both the deductible expenditure and the contested expenditure was the 
same then the tax treatment of both should also be the same.    
 
With regard to the decision of the court a quo in relation to the capital nature 
of the expenditure, Conradie JA held that the taxpayer‟s income earning 
structure was already established and periodic payments were required to 
protect its earnings.134 The court likened these expenses to premiums on 
insurance policies, which are of a revenue nature, and as result the court 
concluded that the expenditure in the Warner Lambert case was of a revenue 
                                                 
131  Ibid. 
132  Ibid at para 16. 
133  Ibid. 
134  Ibid at para 18. 
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nature.135      
 
Emslie, in a brief commentary on the Warner Lambert case, stated that the 
reasoning of the court in this case “may in appropriate circumstances apply 
also to equivalent types of expenditure incurred in modern South Africa to 
comply with legislative obligations or commercial exigencies which entail 
expenditure that might be classified under the rubric of „social 
responsibility.‟”136   
 
6. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS  
 
In May 2009 the South African Revenue Service137 issued a binding class 
ruling in accordance with section 76R of the Income Tax Act and in respect of 
expenditure incurred on corporate social investment programmes.138 
 
In terms of section 76R of the Income Tax Act, a taxpayer can apply to SARS 
for a binding class ruling regarding the application or interpretation of the 
Income Tax Act to a specific class of persons in respect of a proposed 
transaction. Such rulings can be published by SARS but without revealing the 
identity of the applicants or class members.139  
 
The binding class ruling issued in May 2009 was the result of an application 
by a South African holding company and its subsidiary companies,140 which 
intended to enhance its corporate social investment programme in order to 
comply with the BEE scorecard applicable to the class members. 
                                                 
135  Ibid. 
136  Trevor Emslie et al Supplement to Income Tax Cases and Materials 3ed (2008) 65. 
137  Hereinafter referred to as “SARS”. 
138  SARS Binding Class Ruling dated 12 May 2009 under reference number BCR002. 
Available at www.sars.gov.za [Accessed 9 February 2010]. 
139  Income Tax Act, s 76O. 
140  Hereinafter jointly referred to as the “class members”. 
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In order to comply with the socio-economic development element of the 
Codes of Good Practice, the class members were required to spend 1% of 
their net profit after tax on corporate social investment programmes. The 
scheme which the class members intended to undertake was that it would 
provide bursaries to persons from underprivileged backgrounds. The 
structure of this scheme would involve the group of companies as a whole 
and the authority would be exercised by the holding company to manage the 
process of identifying recipients and making recommendations as to their 
applications. The final decision would be taken by the executive committee of 
the holding company and each class member would then be required to 
contribute to the scheme in accordance with the decision of the executive 
committee of the holding company. 
 
The ruling of SARS was that expenditure incurred by the class members in 
complying with the requirements of the Codes of Good Practice and in 
respect of the corporate social investment programmes undertaken by the 
class members would be deductible under the general deduction formula, 
subject to the following conditions: 
 the deduction claimed by each class member shall relate to expenditure 
actually incurred by the said class member for purposes of its own BEE-
rating and not for purposes of the BEE-rating of the group of companies 
as a whole; and 
 each class member claiming a deduction for expenditure related to the 
corporate social investment programme must carry on a trade in terms 
of section 23(g).     
 
Despite the fact that the aforesaid binding class ruling is only binding as 
between SARS and the class members, it is submitted that the decision of 
SARS in this ruling is indicative of the approach which SARS could take in its 
treatment of corporate socio-economic development expenditure.  
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7. THE INCOME TAX DEDUCTIBILITY OF CORPORATE SOCIO-
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT CONTRIBUTIONS 
 
Businesses within all sectors of the South African economy are required to 
make a contribution to corporate socio-economic development in order to 
comply with the Codes of Good Practice or an applicable sector code or 
sector charter. The effect of compliance is ultimately that of business 
necessity as a business is required to have a good BEE-rating in order to do 
business with any government entity and in respect of certain business 
sectors, BEE-ratings and compliance is related to the acquisition of licenses, 
permits, etc. required by a business to operate its business or to generate an 
income. In addition to these reasons for BEE compliance, there is a trend 
amongst businesses to have a good BEE-rating and to require their 
respective business suppliers to also have a good BEE-rating with the result 
that there is a knock-on effect to BEE compliance.       
 
In order to qualify as a tax deductible expense in terms of the Income Tax 
Act, a taxpayer must prove that the corporate socio-economic contributions 
satisfy the requirements of the general deduction formula or qualify as a 
special allowable deduction in accordance with the provisions of the Income 
Tax Act.  
 
In terms of the general deduction formula, the expense must be actually 
incurred, it must be incurred in the production of income, it must not be of a 
capital nature and it must be derived from a trade carried on by a taxpayer.  
 
The case law interpreting the requirements of the general deduction formula 
have been discussed in detail above and in applying these requirements to 
the issue at hand, due consideration must be given to the opinions and 
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interpretations of the learned judges and academics referred to above.  
  
With regard to the requirement that the expense must be actually incurred, 
there appears to be nothing inherent in corporate socio-economic 
development contributions that would prevent such contributions from 
complying with this requirement. The reasons for this assumption are as 
follows:  
 In terms of the definition of “approved socio-economic development 
contributions,” as contained in Schedule 1 to the Codes of Good 
Practice, such contributions can take the form of monetary and non-
monetary contributions. This therefore conforms to the general 
understanding of an expense.141  
 The facts of each case will determine whether there is an unconditional 
legal obligation to pay an expense (Edgars Stores case) and a taxpayer 
which seeks to deduct the corporate socio-economic development 
contributions must ensure that the amount sought to be deducted is not 
an amount which is to be incurred in the future and in respect of which 
the taxpayer has no unconditional legal obligation to pay. For example, 
a taxpayer which has a five-year corporate socio-economic 
development plan cannot deduct the contributions in respect of all five 
years in the first year, unless the taxpayer can prove that he has an 
unconditional legal obligation to make the said contributions for the five-
year period as at the first year.  
 Furthermore, it is submitted that even though it could be argued that a 
taxpayer‟s contributions to corporate socio-economic development are 
not necessary, the fact of the matter is that, subject to satisfying the 
other components of the general deduction formula, considering the 
necessity of the contributions is irrelevant (PE Tramway case).  
 
With regard to the requirement that the expense must be incurred in the 
                                                 
141  Madelaine Stiglingh et al (note 49). 
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production of income, one needs to consider the purpose of the expense 
(Sub-Nigel case) and the close connection between the expense and the 
income-producing operation of the taxpayer (PE Tramway case). On 
application of these considerations to corporate socio-economic development 
contributions, it could be argued that the purpose of the contributions is to 
comply with the requirements of BEE, which compliance can, in certain 
instances, be necessary for the performance of the business of the taxpayer 
(PE Tramway case). For example, in the case of a mining company which 
requires a mining license to operate its business, compliance with the Mining 
Charter and the MPRD Act is essential. The said mining company would 
therefore be compelled to contribute to socio-economic development in order 
to obtain the mining license and the mining company could therefore argue 
that the contributions are a necessary concomitant (Joffe case) to its mining 
operations and therefore qualify as an expense incurred in the production of 
income.  
 
It should be noted that compliance with this requirement is dependant on the 
facts of each case and there could be instances in which it would be difficult 
to satisfy the requirement as it is likely that not all taxpayers can establish a 
close connection between compliance with BEE and the income-producing 
operations of the taxpayer.   
 
With regard to the requirement that the expense cannot be of a capital 
nature, there appears to be conflicting arguments to be made in respect of 
the nature of corporate socio-economic development contributions. To 
understand these arguments, a comparison can be made between a 
taxpayer with a well-established business and a taxpayer in the beginning 
stages of establishing its business. 
 In the Warner Lambert case, the Supreme Court of Appeal rejected the 
decision of the court a quo as relates to the capital nature of the 
corporate social responsibility expenditure and found that the 
expenditure was of a revenue nature. The court‟s reasoning was that 
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the income earning structure of the taxpayer was already established 
and periodic payments were required to protect its earnings. The court 
also likened the expenditure in question with that of insurance 
premiums. It would appear that the reasoning of the court in the Warner 
Lambert case could assist a taxpayer with a well-established business 
to prove that the corporate socio-economic contributions were of a 
revenue nature.  
 In contrast, a taxpayer which is in the beginning stages of establishing 
its business may be bound by the decision of the Appellate Division in 
the Rand Mines case. In this case, the court found that the acquisition of 
certain contracts were part of the income-earning structure of the 
taxpayer as without the contracts, the taxpayer would not have an 
opportunity to generate an income. If one were to apply this reasoning 
to the aforementioned taxpayer, it could be argued that the corporate 
socio-economic development contributions of the taxpayer were part of 
the taxpayer‟s income-earning structure as the taxpayer was dependant 
on a good BEE-rating in order to generate an income and as a result the 
contributions were of a capital nature. A taxpayer in such a situation 
could attempt to rely on the recurrent nature of the contributions to be 
made in order to prove that the contributions were in fact of a revenue 
nature (BP case).    
 
Notwithstanding the conflicting arguments to be made in respect of the 
capital nature of corporate socio-economic development contributions, it 
should be noted that the true nature of the expense is a matter of fact (New 
State Areas case) and furthermore, an apportionment is possible if it is found 
that an expense is partly of a revenue nature and partly of a capital nature 
(Guardian Assurance case).  
 
With regard to the trade requirement, it is clear that an absence of profit does 
not exclude a transaction from satisfying this requirement (De Beers case, 
ITC 1404 and Warner Lambert case). This is an important consideration as 
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corporate socio-economic development contributions are by their very nature 
not intended to produce a profit.  
 
In the Warner Lambert case the court distinguished between purpose and 
consequence and stated that these two concepts should not be mistaken 
when determining the trade purpose of an expense. It is submitted that the 
distinction between purpose and effect, as stated by Emslie in his 
commentary on the Pick ‘n Pay case, is identical to the distinction made in 
the Warner Lambert case. Based on the aforegoing distinction, it could be 
argued that even though the consequences or effects of corporate socio-
economic contributions could entail certain non-trade elements, the purpose 
for which these contributions are made are related to the trade of the 
taxpayer and therefore deductible. 
 
The introduction of apportionment into section 23(g) has the result that in a 
case where it is found that there is a dual purpose to an expense (Pick „n Pay 
case), the expense will be deductible to the extent of the trade purpose 
thereof and it is therefore possible that a portion, if not the entire expense, 
could be deductible in such a case.    
  
With regard to the applicability of the special allowable deductions to the 
deduction of corporate socio-economic development contributions, one would 
need to consider the facts of each situation. It should, however, be noted that 
special consideration should be given to section 18A of the Income Tax Act, 
which deals with the deduction of donations to public benefit organisations 
and other qualifying beneficiaries as it is possible that certain corporate 
socio-economic development contributions would qualify for deduction under 
this section and as a result one would not need to consider the general 
deduction formula.     
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8. CONCLUSION 
 
In light of the aforegoing discussion, it is clear that one cannot adopt a 
standard approach as relates to the deductibility of the broad-based black 
economic empowerment‟s corporate socio-economic development 
contributions. The intention and purpose of the taxpayer and the facts of each 
case are key factors in determining whether the corporate socio-economic 
development contributions of a particular taxpayer are deductible.     
 
The judgment of the Supreme Court of Appeal in the Warner Lambert case 
as well as the Binding Class Ruling issued by SARS are strong indicators of 
the direction in which the deductibility of these contributions are headed and 
it is only a matter of time before this issue will be before our courts for 
deliberation.  
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